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This paper analyses the decision to invest in quality by a hospital in an environment 
where doctors are devoted workers, i.e. they care for specific aspects of the output they 
produce. We assume that quality is the result of both an investment in new technology 
and the effort of the medical staff. Hospital services are paid on the basis of their 
marginal cost of production while the number of patients treated depends on a 
purchasing rule which discriminates for the level and timing of the investment. We 
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the purchasing rule so that for the hospital it is not always optimal to anticipate the 
investment decision. 
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All advanced health care systems have to cope with the need to control
growth expenditure without over-reducing investments in new technology,
in order to guarantee patients adequate quality (Bokhari, 2001; Baker, 2001;
Propper, 2004; HTC 2003). In this context, it is important to overcome the
traditional (and somehow misleading) trade-o⁄ between cost and quality,
where the latter is simply seen as a running cost1.
In this paper, we argue that the quality of hospital care is determined
by two main factors: the capital invested (i.e. adoption of new technologies)
which is usually irreversible, and the e⁄ort of the personnel employed which
has a more complex objective function than standard workers. Therefore,
hospital care needs a more comprehensive modelling approach which consid-
ers the particular features of the production process as regards investment
decisions on medical equipment and human capital. Following Chalkley and
Malcomson (2000), we de￿ne quality as a multivariable vector that includes
all the aspects of medical care such as the appropriateness of the treatment,
the investment in technology that bene￿ts the recipients, and other aspects
that are not strictly medical but that can improve hospital output, such
as patient accessibility (proper information by hospital sta⁄, short waiting
times before treatment etc.) and hotel quality.
In this respect, the paper analyses a Nash game between a hospital
and its medical sta⁄ to determine the quality level of health care within
an intertemporal model where the investment implemented by the hospital
is irreversible, because of physical or economic reasons. In this game, the
quality of hospital care and doctors￿e⁄orts are non-contractable variables
(i.e. they cannot be enforced before a court). In modelling the behaviour
of the medical sta⁄ and the related choice of doctors￿e⁄orts, we follow the
literature on the ￿devoted workers￿which has pointed out the di⁄erences in
the choice of the e⁄ort by a worker (in our case, a doctor) who is interested
in both the outcome and the technology content of the productive process
adopted (Francois, 2000, 2003; Glazer, 2004)2.
Furthermore, we analyse how a purchaser (e.g. an insurance company,
an HMO or a public health authority) who pursues its patients￿welfare
may in￿ uence the hospital￿ s quality choice through strategic setting of the
parameters of a purchasing rule that relates the volume of hospital care to
be reimbursed to the timing of the hospital￿ s investment decision.
1See Harris (1979), Ellis and Mc Guire (1986), Newhouse (1996), Ma (1994), Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998, 2000 and 2002), Bigliaser and Ma (2003).
2Interesting examples are ￿remen, university professors and medical sta⁄.
2In order to analyse hospital investment in health care technology, we use
a real option approach3. Essentially this approach posits that the opportu-
nity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on the
investment opportunity. Since the future value of the project is uncertain,
there is an opportunity cost to investing today. Another example of option
game between a purchaser and a hospital over the investment in quality
can be traced in Levaggi and Moretto (2004). In that model, however, the
medical sta⁄ did not play any role in the investment in quality4.
We show that the strategic behaviour between the doctors and the hos-
pital a⁄ects the hospital￿ s decision both on the level and the timing of in-
vestment. Since the investment decision is the result of the Nash game
between the medical sta⁄ and the hospital, the latter can use the devoted
characteristic of the physician to substitute investment with e⁄ort in order
to maximise its intertemporal surplus. In particular, our model provides a
surprising result as regards the timing of the investment: if the purchaser
aims at maximising the current level of quality (i.e. the earlier adoption of
a new technology by the hospital), the adoption of a purchasing rule linking
the volume of current hospital admissions to be reimbursed to the invest-
ment made in the past periods may not be optimal. That is, in contrast
with the real option theory, we show that it is not necessary to drive to zero
the ￿rm￿ s option to wait for more information to convince it to invest soon5.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the basic model.
In section three, the Nash equilibrium of the game between the hospital and
the medical sta⁄ is presented. In section four, the relationship between the
Nash equilibrium and the purchasing rule is analysed. Lastly, section ￿ve
concludes.
3See Abel et al. (1996), Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
4Also B￿s and Fraja (2002) study a game between a health care authority and a hospital
over the investment in quality. However, they do not consider the intertemporal aspect
of the investment in health care and the speci￿c e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄ in determining
the level of quality. Furthermore, they allow the purchaser to rely on outside providers to
induce the hospital to increase its investment.
5This contrasts also with the result obtained by Levaggi and Moretto (2004) who
showed that the problem of non-veri￿ability of quality could usually be avoided by a
purchasing rule linking the volume of current care to be reimbursed to the investment
made in the past periods, which induces the hospital to anticipate the investment.
32 The model
The model deals with the investment choices of a representative hospital
and the e⁄ort decision made by its medical sta⁄ in a two-period framework.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that patients admitted to the hospital
can be a⁄ected only by one disease that requires a standard treatment. The
total quality of hospital care is determined by its clinical e⁄ectiveness and
by perceived quality, as explained in the next section. A new technology for
producing hospital care is available at time 1 and the hospital may decide
the level of investment (i.e. the number of technology units) in each period.
The e⁄ort of medical sta⁄ is set at time 1 and is kept constant over time.
Both capital and doctors￿e⁄orts contribute to determining the total quality
qt, t = 1;2. We also assume that, once the investment in the new technology
is undertaken, it cannot be diverted and depreciation is absent6.
2.1 Quality and its aspects
The outcome of hospital care depends on several variables, some of which
cannot be controlled by any of the parts involved in the hospital production
process. The main determinants of hospital care outcome are: the quality of
the treatment, patient￿ s compliance with therapy and his ability to recover.
These elements interact: a high level of quality makes the patient con￿dent
of recovering his health and motivates him to comply and, sometimes, might
enhance the placebo e⁄ect of the treatment. In this process the perceived
quality is equally (sometimes more) important than the clinical quality of
health care. However, the patient cannot fully perceive clinical outcome
because of his ignorance of health care. In his assessment of quality he
might sometimes be biased towards elements that he can readily observe
and measure, even if they are not the most important ones.
In our analysis we de￿ne total quality as:
q = F(qp;qc) (1)
where qp ￿ 0 represents the quality perceived by patients, qc ￿ 0 is the
clinical quality, with F(0;qc) ￿ 0 and F(qp;0) ￿ 0: Perceived and clinical
quality can be interpreted as two intermediate outcomes in the process lead-
ing to total quality. The term qp captures important aspects relating to the
6Together with irreversibility of investment, this assumption avoids the need to consider
operating options for the hospital such as reducing output or even shutting down, and
thereby considering reducing variable costs. For further details on this issue see e.g. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994).
4quality as perceived by patients: access to hospital services, level of com-
fort in hospital care (hotel quality measured by number of beds per room,
visiting times, private telephones, nurses per ward, etc.) and relationship
with the medical sta⁄(appropriate information on the therapy and its likely
e⁄ectiveness, shared motivation with doctors and other personnel as regards
the therapy, establishing a satisfactory human relationship with sta⁄, etc.)7.
Perceived quality can be assumed to be a function of the ancillary services s
(which the literature often de￿nes "hotel-related quality services") and the
e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄ devoted to patient-centered care e (Stewart, 1995,
2000). That is:
qp = h(s;e;") (2)
where " is a random variable which is related to unknown patients￿charac-
teristics and their prior beliefs concerning health outcomes. This speci￿ca-
tion corresponds to the way most of the traditional literature models health
care quality: a running cost that depends on some inputs and the e⁄ort
of the medical sta⁄8. This de￿nition, however, and especially its speci￿ca-
tion, are not su¢ cient to de￿ne the overall quality of hospital care. Another
important element is clinical quality which, we believe, has to be treated sep-
arately from the previous term since it also depends on investment decisions
concerning medical technology.
The clinical quality of hospital care can be written as an increasing
function of three inputs:
qc = g(k;e;a;￿)
where: k represents the level of capital invested in medical technology, e is
the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄, a is the appropriateness of the care o⁄ered
to the patient and ￿ is a random parameter that captures the unknown
characteristics of each patient (which can in￿ uence the health outcome) as
well as all the other uncertain determinants in￿ uencing clinical quality (e.g.
shocks on input productivity etc.). Appropriateness a measures the use of
hospital resources in order to respond (according to clinical standards and
existing medical evidence) to a speci￿c health care demand. We assume
7q
p represents the quality as perceived by patients when they actually use hospital
care services and experience a relationship with hospital sta⁄. Under this perspective,
the concept of perceived quality we adopt here is very close to relational quality and
should be considered distinct from the concept of reputation which can drive competition
between hospitals and which depends not only on patients￿experience of hospital care (i.e.
perceived quality) but also on people￿ s beliefs concerning hospital technology and sta⁄
before their actual experience of hospital services.
8See Chalckley and Malcomson (2000).
5that the appropriateness of the care delivered is an increasing function of
medical e⁄ort, i.e.:
a = a(e;￿) (3)
The underlying assumption is that the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄permits
precise diagnosis and appropriate treatment for the patient9. The e⁄ort of
the medical sta⁄ provides the patient with personalised treatment which,
due to the presence of ￿, cannot be standardised (e.g. through protocols or
guidelines). The e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄ enhances the productivity of the
capital invested in health care. Medical technology is per se important to
improve medical care, but it is the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄that determines
the appropriateness of the treatment. Using (3), clinical quality can be
written as:
qc = g(k;e;￿) (4)
where ￿ = (￿;￿): Substituting (4) and (2) into (1), and assuming, without
any loss of generality, that s is ￿xed10 (so that qp depends only on e), we
obtain the following functional form for total quality:
q = F (h(e;");g(k;e;￿)) (5)
For the perceived and clinical quality the usual marginal properties hold:
he > 0;hee < 0 and ge > 0;gk > 0; gee < 0;gkk < 0 respectively. We
complete these properties by assuming that capital and e⁄ort are substitutes,
i.e. gke < 0 and gk￿ > 011.
9Therefore, we assume that appropriateness does not depend on k However, the real
e⁄ect of k on the appropriateness of hospital care is controversial. Sometimes appropri-
ateness is determined by the ability of doctors to keep themselves abreast of technical
developments which are often more ￿ capital intensive￿and are considered really e⁄ective
according to Evidence Based Medicine (e.g. the adoption of laparoscopy instead of tradi-
tional surgery in cholecystectomy); in this case, appropriateness could be positively related
to k. In other cases, however, the relationship between a and k could assume a negative
sign. For instance, to accomplish a ￿rst diagnosis of bronchopneumonia or to ascertain the
existence of particular orthopaedic diseases, the use of traditional X-ray diagnostics could
be sometimes equally (or even more) e⁄ective than using CAT (Computed Axial Tomog-
raphy) scan. Therefore, the relationship between a and k is rather ambiguous, depending
on the particular health care problem considered.
10For the sake of simplicity, we assume that hotel-related quality is set at a standard
level. In this way, we focus on the perceived quality determined by the e⁄ort of medical
sta⁄ devoted to the relationship with patients. Moreover, we do not consider a hospital￿ s
investment in hotel services but only in new clinical technology. Anyway, our main results
hold even with a variable s.
11Although not strictly necessary for the results we may add that g(0;e;￿) = g(k;0;￿) =
0.
6Finally, we assume that (5) is additive and separable in qp and qc; i.e.:12
q = (1 ￿ ￿)qp + ￿qc ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)h(e;") + ￿g(k;e;￿) (6)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 parameterizes the marginal rate of substitution
between k and e:
2.2 The actors
In this paper we model the behaviour of three main actors: an agency
purchasing hospital care (the purchaser), a hospital (the provider) and its
medical sta⁄.
2.2.1 The purchaser
We do not assume a speci￿c objective function for the purchaser. However,
even if this actor limits itself to setting the parameters of a purchasing rule
in order to maximise total quality on behalf of its patients13, its role is not
marginal as will be shown in this paper14. The maximisation of total quality
can be pursued by supporting hospital investment in new technologies and
stimulating a high level of e⁄ort by the medical sta⁄. The purchaser pursues
its objective by rewarding the hospital a ￿xed price p for each treatment
and setting a quality-contingent long-term contract with the hospital15. In
particular, we assume that the number of patients needing treatment is
independent of quality, but the purchaser reimburses the hospital for the
treatment of a number of patients which is ￿xed in the ￿rst period, x1 ￿
x ￿ 0; and may increase in the second period if the hospital increases its
total quality. In other words, we assume that the purchaser is committed
to linking the number of patients to be treated in the second period to the
quality provided by the hospital using the following linear rule:
x2(q1;q2) ￿ x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2 ￿ q1) with ￿;￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ (7)
where x is ￿xed, q1 and q2 are the level of total quality in the ￿rst period
and in the second period respectively, and ￿ and ￿ represent the relative




13In this respect, it can be considered a perfect agent of the patients.
14A vast empirical literature has studied the e⁄ect of di⁄erent reimbursement setting
on the adoption of new technology. See HTC (2003) for a review.
15Price p can be either a DRG tari⁄ or any other form of prospective price for a speci￿c
treatment.
7weights attached by the purchaser to the quality in the two periods. Since
investment is irreversible, if ￿ = 0; the hospital is allowed to increase its
(reimbursed) activity level only if it increases the total quality in the second
period; if ￿ = 0; x2 depends only on the quality level at time t = 1 while, if
￿ = ￿, x2 depends on the quality level at time t = 2:
The purchasing rule (7) can be interpreted in this way: each hospital,
by increasing total quality (in both periods) can increase the number of
admitted (and rewarded) patients. Therefore, rule (7) represents either a
situation in which higher quality hospitals attract more patients who are free
to choose their preferred provider (and the purchaser pays for the increased
admissions to higher quality hospitals), or a situation in which the purchaser
buys more treatments from higher quality hospitals on behalf of the patients
it represents. For example, in the US an HMO could set the number of
patients to be treated in each hospital according to some quality indices; in
the Italian NHS, an ASL (Azienda Sanitaria Locale: the purchaser) could
remove (reduce) part of the yearly ceiling set on the number of treatments
if the hospital increases the quality of treatments16.
2.2.2 The medical sta⁄
Doctors are "devoted workers", i.e. they receive utility from increasing their
patients￿health and therefore they prefer an earlier adoption of new tech-
nologies by the hospital that enables a rapid achievement of health outcomes
on behalf of their patients. The ￿ devoted worker￿assumption can be justi-
￿ed on several grounds: the doctor could be considered a benevolent agent
that truly believes that better health outcomes for patients can be achieved
through progress in medical technology; he might even be biased in his
evaluation of the e⁄ectiveness of the new technology since he wants early
adoption for the bene￿t of his principal (the patient). On the other hand,
the doctor might also be motivated by sel￿sh interests and might wish to
use the new technology to quicken his career and enhance his reputation. In
any case, the technology of production enters the doctor￿ s utility function
with a positive sign and he is interested in earlier adoption of new med-
ical equipment. He provides the e⁄ort that determines the level of total
quality as de￿ned by (6). In particular, the doctor￿ s e⁄ort input consists
of two components. The ￿rst is a minimum level of e⁄ort el; which can be
de￿ned as ￿ monitored e⁄ort of the doctor￿ , and is delivered independently
16It must be pointed out that, following rule (7), higher quality hospitals are rewarded
with more bought admissions at a given price p; however, the results hold even if the
number of admissions were set constant, while the price varies according to quality levels.
8of the adoption of the new technology by the hospital (we assume without
losing in generality that el = 0). The second component is a level of e⁄ort
e; which cannot be observed or veri￿ed by the other actors. Following the
literature on the devoted worker (Francois, 2000, 2003; Glazer, 2004), we
assume that the doctor is not paid for the unveri￿able e⁄ort, though this
assumption can be relaxed without substantially changing the results. The
hospital hires doctors at the constant exogenous wage w; the private cost
for the unveri￿able e⁄ort e is de￿ned by m(e); with m0 > 0 and m00 > 0: Fi-
nally, since doctors are interested in earlier adoption of the new technology,
we can assume, without losing in generality, that e1 = e2 = e.
2.2.3 The hospital
The hospital is a surplus maximiser and in this respect it is interested in cost
minimisation. In our model the hospital becomes interested in the quality
of the care provided through the purchasing rule (7).
It stipulates a contract with the purchaser that foresees the payment of
a prospective price p for each treatment. In each period, the hospital can
invest in a new technology at unit cost r17. Then capital accumulation is
given by k2 = k1 + i2; where i2 denotes investment in period 2. Both the
investment and the e⁄ort made by the medical sta⁄ determine the level of
total quality according to (6).
In addition to investment costs, the hospital faces some operating costs
in running the new technology. Operating costs di⁄er from period to period
due to our assumption concerning the nature of the investment decision. In
general, these costs are higher in the ￿rst period due to set-up costs, such
as learning cost and human capital formation, and lower in the subsequent
periods18. Again, to simplify we set c1 = c < p and c2 = 0:
By the above arguments, the hospital net surplus in the ￿rst period is:
R1(k1;e) ￿ (p ￿ c)x ; (8)
17In this article, we assume that the investment cost does not change over time. How-
ever, the results would not change if we assume that the investment cost at time 2 is lower
than at time 1, i.e. r2 < r1 (Levaggi and Moretto, 2004) or decreases with the dimension
of the project, i.e. r(k) with r
0(k) < 0 (Dixit, 1993).
18As an example, we might think about introducing laser therapy to treat patients with
speci￿c diseases. In the ￿rst period, we will have to bear the cost of the equipment and
the cost related to teaching the sta⁄ how to use the new technology. In the second period,
the purchase of another laser to treat the same ailment simply increases the cost due to
the higher number of treated patients.
9and in the second period is:
R2(k1;k2;e;";￿) ￿ px2(q1;q2) (9)
￿ p[x + ￿q1(k1;e;"1;￿1) + ￿(q2(k2;e;"2;￿2) ￿ q1(k1;e;"1;￿1))]
2.2.4 Information structure and timing
Since the quality of hospital care and the doctors￿e⁄orts are non-contractable
variables (i.e. even though the parties of a contract can observe or measure
them, they cannot be enforced before a court), our model may present sev-
eral forms of asymmetry of infomation among the three actors considered
here. In particular, we assume that in each period:
￿ No one of the three actors is able to verify the current level of total
quality qt;
￿ The purchaser and the hospital cannot directly verify the doctors￿
e⁄orts et.
Yet, since quality is a function of both the investment by the hospital
and the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄, which is not observable by a third party,
we also get:
￿ The contribution of the capital to the current quality level is not fully
veri￿able by both the purchaser and the doctors19.
However, since in our two-period model the purchaser may observe ex-
post the hospital capital k1 and the doctors￿e⁄orts e, we introduce a time-
gap in observing and verifying the main elements of the contract, that is:
￿ The purchaser may always verify ex post q1 before a court (or a health
care authority).
3 E⁄ort and investment decision
Given the purchasing rule (7) and the information set, at time 1 the hospital
and the doctors choose their state variables k1 and e simultaneously and
non-cooperatively.
19Intuitively, given that quality is not veri￿able, even if the medical sta⁄ can observe
the level of investment in new technology, it cannot claim a high result in quality by the
provision of its e⁄ort.
10Since doctors keep the level of e⁄ort constant over time, qp di⁄ers from
period 1 to period 2 only for the realisation of the patients￿characteristics ":
Without any loss in generality, we simplify the model by setting " constant
over time20.
Therefore, uncertainty in the production process derives only from shocks
a⁄ecting the clinical quality ￿. As for ￿, we assume that, in the ￿rst period,
￿1 is known and normalised to 1 while, in the second period, ￿2 ￿ ￿ is
stochastic and its realisation is characterised by the cumulative distribution
￿(￿) with density ￿0(￿) > 0 on ￿ 2 [0;1), which is known by all the
actors21.
By the above assumptions, the timing of the model can be summarised
as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the purchaser announces the pur-
chasing rule (7) and the price p. The hospital and the medical sta⁄, knowing
￿1; and the purchasing rule, decide non-cooperatively k1 and e respectively.
At the beginning of period 2, q1 becomes veri￿able, nature reveals ￿2 and,
conditional on k1 and e (i.e. q1), the hospital chooses k2:
Before proceeding with the medical sta⁄ and hospital decisions, we need
to consider the ex-ante objective function of both these actors.
3.1 The medical sta⁄￿ s ex-ante objective function
The medical sta⁄ are paid an exogenous wage w and their e⁄ort is constant
over time; their objective function can be written as:
B(k1;e) ￿ w+vq1(k1;e)￿m(e) = w+v[(1￿￿)h(e)+￿g(k1;e)]￿m(e) (10)
where v is the doctor￿ s evaluation of each unit of quality.
3.2 The hospital￿ s ex-ante objective function
The hospital decision to invest in health care technology is intertemporal.
In particular, if in period 1 the hospital makes an investment that it cannot
resell in period 2 and future capital returns are uncertain, this investment
decision involves the exercise of an option. Because of this uncertainty, the
opportunity of waiting to learn more about the future productivity level has
a timing premium (i.e. a holding value).
We start by describing the hospital action in the second period, given
the stock of investment k1 inherited from period 1. We then step back and
20" can be the mean value of the shocks a⁄ecting the perceived quality.
21As in B￿s and De Fraja (2002), we assume that there is symmetry of information
about the technology.
11show how the marginal pro￿t in the ￿rst period depends on the hospital￿ s
expected action in the second period.
Second period
By (9), (7) and (6) the hospital￿ s surplus at time 2 can be written as:
R2(k1;k2;e;￿) ￿ p[x + ￿q1(k1;e) + ￿(q2(k2;e;￿) ￿ q1(k1;e))] (11)
￿ p[x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)h(e) + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿g(k1;e) + ￿￿g(k2;e;￿)]
The assumptions on qc guarantee that R2
k2(k1;k2;e;￿)) ￿ 0 is continuous
and strictly decreasing in k2 and continuous and strictly increasing in ￿ (see
Appendix A). Then, for a given stock of k1 inherited from period 1 and
e⁄ort e, we can de￿ne a critical value of ￿ such that:22
R2
k2(k1;e; ~ ￿) ￿ p￿￿gk2(k1;e; ~ ￿) = r (12)
At the beginning of period 2, nature reveals ￿ and the hospital adjusts
its stock of capital to the new optimal level that we identify as k2(￿): The
stock of capital must satisfy the constraint:
k2(￿) ￿ k1 (13)
Thus, depending on the inherited stock k1 and e; from (12) it emerges that
when ￿ > ~ ￿(k1;e); it is optimal for the hospital to invest in extra units of
technology up to the point where the marginal return equals the marginal
investment cost r: On the other hand, when ￿ < ~ ￿(k1;e) the pro￿t is so low
that the hospital ￿nds it convenient not to invest, so k2(￿) = k1:
First period
By using the option decomposition proposed by Abel et al.(1996), we
can show that:




















12Lemma 1 The value of the hospital￿ s investment can be written as:









f￿[p￿￿g(k2(￿);e;￿) ￿ rk2(￿)] + [p￿￿g(k1;e;￿) ￿ rk1]gd￿(￿)
and ￿ is the discount factor.
Proof. See Appendix A
The term G(k1;e) is the hospital￿ s expected present value of returns,
keeping the stock of capital ￿xed at k1: This can be interpreted as the
hospital￿ s value when it does not expand its investment in the second period.
The term O(k1;e) indicates the value of the (call) option to expand the
capital in the second period if ￿ rises above ~ ￿: Equation (14) then has
an interesting and immediate interpretation: when the hospital invests in
period 1 it gets the value G(k1;e) but gives up the opportunity or option to
invest in the future, valued at O(k1;e):
The non-contractability of k1 and e in the ￿rst period implies that the
investment decisions by both actors are taken non-cooperatively. In this
respect, equations (10) and (14) constitute a two-person normal form game.
Therefore, we need to derive the best reply functions of the two actors.
3.3 The best reply function of the doctor
The doctor￿ s reaction curve is derived from his ￿rst-order condition on (10),
that is:
Be(k1;e) ￿ v[(1 ￿ ￿)h0(e) + ￿ge(k1;e)] ￿ m0(e) = 0 (15)
Moreover, since:
Bee(k1;e) ￿ v[(1 ￿ ￿)h00(e) + ￿gee(k1;e)] ￿ m00(e) < 0
for any given value of k1 a unique value of e￿ exists satisfying equation (15).









v[(1 ￿ ￿)h00(e) + ￿gee(k1;e)] ￿ m00(e)
Since the two inputs are substitutes, i.e. gek(k1;e) < 0; the doctor￿ s
reaction curve slopes downwards. This assumption appears plausible: an
increase in the doctor￿ s e⁄ort somehow reduces hospital investment in capi-
tal, and vice versa. This is represented by the curve DD in Figure 1.
Figure 1 about here
3.4 The best reply function of the hospital
Similarly, the hospital reaction function is obtained by the ￿rst-order con-
dition on (14). The optimal amount of capital in period 1 depends on a
comparison between marginal bene￿ts and marginal costs:
Vk1(k1;e) ￿ Gk1(k1;e) ￿ ￿Ok1(k1;e) = r (17)
where:











[p￿￿gk1(k1;e;￿) ￿ r]d￿(￿) ￿ 0
Equation (17) emphasises the role played by the option pricing approach
in determining the stock of capital in period 1. The hospital optimal behav-
iour does not simply require the equalisation of the expected present value
of marginal returns in the ￿rst period, i.e. Gk1(k1;e) and the marginal cost
of the investment r: In fact, costs are represented by the price of the invest-
ment, r; plus the value of the marginal call option, Ok1(k1;e); as investing
14in period 1 means giving up the opportunity of delaying the investment.
Moreover, since:
Vk1k1(k1;e) ￿ Gk1k1(k1;e) ￿ ￿Ok1k1(k1;e)












for any given value of r and e, a unique value of k￿
1 exists satisfying equation
(17).













Since the two inputs are substitutes we get Vk1e(k1;e) < 0 and then (18)
is downward-sloping. This is represented by the curve HH in Figure 1.
3.5 The equilibrium
The intersection of the two best reply functions is the Nash equilibrium, de-
noted by N in Figure 1. We also assume that the doctor￿ s reaction function
is steeper than the hospital reaction function23. This guarantees that the
Nash equilibrium is unique and stable (Vives 1999, p. 49-52). Therefore,
the following proposition holds (see Figure 1):
23This assumption seems reasonable since in most cases the rate of substitution between
capital and e⁄ort is higher for doctors than for the hospital.
15Proposition 1 1) The presence of devoted doctors implies underinvestment
at time t = 1.
2) The Nash equilibrium is not optimal since it usually implies a lower
level of e⁄ort and investment than the First Best.
Proof. See Appendix B
The ￿rst part of proposition 1 is a straightforward application of the
geometric solution of the Nash equilibrium. In Figure 1, the point (^ k1;0)
represents the benchmark solution for the case of a doctor that is not a
devoted worker. In this case, the level of capital is higher than in our Nash
solution N = (k￿
1;e￿).
To compare the Nash solution with the First Best, we need to depict
the hospital iso-pro￿t and the doctor￿ s iso-utility curves. In Figure 1, PP
represents the hospital iso-pro￿t curve and UU the doctor iso-utility curve
going through point N. The First Best is the set of points where the iso-
pro￿t and iso-utility curves are tangent. From Figure 1, it can be seen that
these points are characterized by a higher level of e⁄ort and investment.
4 Purchasing rule and Nash equilibrium
Let￿ s now investigate how the purchaser can in￿ uence the investment/e⁄ort
mix by changing the parameters of the purchasing rule (7). In particular
we compare the Nash equilibria for the following alternative values of the
parameters of the purchasing rule:
￿ ￿ = 0;so that the number of patients whose treatment is reimbursed
in the second period depends only on the quality level at time t = 1;
￿ ￿ = ￿;so that the number of patients whose treatment is reimbursed
in the second period depends only on the quality level at time t = 2 ;
￿ ￿ = 0; and the hospital can increase the number of patients treated in
the second period (and its rewards) only if the quality increases in the
second period.
This comparison has important policy implications as in the ￿rst case
the option to delay the investment held by the hospital is neutralized. That
is, even if the level of quality can be observed only ex post, asymmetry of
information is ruled out of the system. When the contract is signed, the
purchaser cannot observe both the level of investment in health technology
and the doctor￿ s e⁄ort, but he will be able to do so before implementing the
16relevant part of the contract. In our model this is a su¢ cient deterrent to
prevent the hospital and doctor cheating on their decision variables in the
￿rst period. In the second period the issue becomes irrelevant since the new
investment is not considered in the decision of how many patients to send
to the hospital.
Since the purchasing rule a⁄ects only the hospital objective function,
in order to analyse how the Nash solutions change varying the parameters






1 the level of capital that the hospital would
obtain under the three cases examined, we can prove the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2 1) For ￿ su¢ ciently low, the level of capital and e⁄ort in









and 0 < e￿ < e￿￿=￿ <
e￿￿=0
e￿￿=0
2) For ￿ su¢ ciently high the level of capital and e⁄ort in period 1 can





1 and e￿￿=0 < e￿ < e￿￿=￿
while a Nash equilibrium for ￿ = 0 does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix C
A ￿rst important result follows from Proposition 2: the purchaser can
induce the substitution of capital with e⁄ort by reducing the weight ￿ of
the ￿rst period quality q1 in the rule (7). That is, an increase in the ratio
￿=￿ shifts down the hospital￿ s best reply function (17) with respect to (18),





1 ; and e￿ < e￿￿=￿ < e￿￿=0 as depicted in
Figure 2.
As the real option theory predicts, an increase in the ratio ￿=￿ (i.e in
the weight of the option to wait ￿ compared to the weight of investing today
￿) delays the investment decision. This is a consequence of the "bad news
principle of irreversible investment": a variance in health quality makes the
investment return volatile with positive e⁄ect on the value of the investment.
However, the net marginal bene￿t of waiting, arising from the avoidance of
an investment in the bad state, increases. This induces delay (Bernanke,
1983).
A second important result that follows from Proposition 2 is the im-
possibility of a global ranking in terms of substitution between capital and
17e⁄ort. In fact, the optimal level of investment is not maximised for ￿ = 0;
which contradicts the real option theory. That is, despite the disappearance
of the option e⁄ect, we do not obtain a clear increase in the investment in




The parameter ￿ in￿ uences both the expected marginal returns of the
investment Gk1(k1;e) and the marginal call option, Ok1(k1;e): This means
that its e⁄ect is countervailing since it incentivates delaying the investment,
but it increases its expected marginal return in the ￿rst period. The overall
e⁄ect may lead to Vk1(k1;e) > V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) and then k￿
1 > k￿￿=0
1 . This leads
indeed to the second important result of proposition 2. For any given ￿; a
threshold ~ ￿ may exist such that:
Vk1(k1;e) ￿ V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
Vk1(k1;e) < V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) for ￿ > ~ ￿
If the option e⁄ect (i.e. ￿) is su¢ ciently high; the disequality may be re-
verted and we get k￿
1 < k￿￿=0
1 (Appendix C).
Figure 2 about here
5 Purchasing rule and total quality
As argued, the purchaser wants to maximise total quality in order to make
the best treatment available for its patients. Although it cannot control
hospital care quality, it can pursue its goal by in￿ uencing both the hospital
investment in new technologies and the level of e⁄ort by the medical sta⁄
in the ￿rst period. This can be done by setting the parameters of the
purchasing rule. In particular the following proposition holds :
Proposition 3 Within the long-term contract between the hospital and the
purchaser, the latter is able to rank the total quality at t = 1 as follows:

















18Proof. See Appendix D
The intuition for this result relies on the properties of the doctor￿ s best
reply function DD. For example, we can compare the total quality at N
with the one at N￿=￿(see Figure 3). Let￿ s consider the ￿ isoqual￿QQ that
goes through N and depicts all the values of k1 and e compatible with a given
quality level. As k1 decreases, the doctor increases e along the curve DD;
but if the marginal cost of the e⁄ort increases with e; this is not su¢ cient
to keep the quality constant. Therefore, to the right of the point N, the
isoqual QQ lies above the doctor￿ s reply function DD; while to the left of
N, it lies below DD. This implies that point N￿=￿, which represents the
Nash solution for ￿ = ￿; lies on an isoqual lower than the one through N;
with a reduction in the total quality. Similar results apply for the cases of
￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0.
These results have important implications both in theoretical and policy
terms. In our model - as stated by the ￿rst part of Proposition 3 - for ￿
below a speci￿c threshold
￿
￿, total quality is higher than when the purchasing
rule is based only on past investment (￿ = 0). This implies that, for ￿
su¢ ciently low but positive, the purchaser can increase total quality in the
￿rst period without eliminating the hospital option value of investing in the
second period. This is possible because of the existence of a substitution
e⁄ect between capital and devoted physicians￿e⁄orts. If ￿ = 0, there should
be no substitution between capital and e⁄ort24.
Figure 3 about here
From proposition 3, we can also determine whether total quality is higher
at the Nash solution, where the doctor values the quality, than at the solution
where the doctor does not.
Corollary 1 The total quality is higher when the doctor values it, i.e.
q￿
1 > q1(^ k1;0)
Proof. See Appendix E
If the doctor is not devoted, he sets e = 0 (i.e. his e⁄ort is only el) and
the hospital sets the investment at (^ k1;0), where the reply function intersects
the vertical axis. To compare the total quality at N with the one at (^ k1;0)
24Di⁄erently in Moretto and Levaggi (2004) the investment was higher when the option
value to invest in the second period was set to zero (i.e. ￿ was made equal to zero); in fact,
the purchasing rule is backward looking (since the hospital receives more patients only if
it has invested in past periods) and the current level of investment i2 is never considered.
19we consider the isoqual that goes through (^ k1;0), i.e. the curve ^ Q ^ Q in Figure
3. Since the marginal rate of transformation between k1 and e is decreasing,
the isoqual through point (^ k1;0) lies below the curve of the hospital￿ s reply
function HH. That is, the hospital may respond optimally to an increase
in the e⁄ort made by the doctor by reducing the investment less than the
reduction required by the isoqual through point (^ k1;0). Therefore, point N
lies on an isoqual higher than the one through (^ k1;0).
If the medical sta⁄are not devoted, the purchaser is not able to in￿ uence
the trade-o⁄ between e⁄ort and capital, hence it is indi⁄erent between a
purchasing rule de￿ned on quality or on the level of capital. Its purchasing
rule can be written as:
x2(k1;k2) ￿ x + ￿k1 + ￿(k2 ￿ k1) with ￿;￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿







1 as in Levaggi and Moretto (2004).
In a context where the medical sta⁄ are not devoted, the purchaser
faces an intertemporal trade-o⁄ in deciding the level of investment, i.e. it
might decide to delay hospital investment in new technology either for policy
reasons or due to the existence of a budget constraint, but by doing so it
faces the cost of verifying hospital care quality (i.e. it can verify quality only
ex-post). In this case the problem in itself o⁄ers a simple solution: setting
￿ = 0 in the purchasing rule permits maximisation of the level of investment
at t = 1 and rules out any veri￿ability problem.
On the contrary, with the presence of devoted doctors, a true trade-o⁄
exists between the level and veri￿ability of quality. The devoted worker
adds an important dimension to the set of choices of the purchaser. Besides
the intertemporal substitution between present and future investment, it
becomes possible to substitute capital with doctor￿ s e⁄ort to increase total
quality. In this way, it is possible to get a higher quality even with a lower
investment in new technology, but now ￿ = 0 is no longer su¢ cient to rule
out the veri￿ability problem.
6 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper adds important new dimensions to the
debate on quality and investment in new technology in hospital care.
Considering the interaction between three actors (a purchaser, a hos-
pital and a hospital￿ s medical sta⁄), we explicitly model two fundamental
20determinants of hospital care quality: the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄ and
the investment in hospital technology which has the characteristic of being
irreversible. The latter had been introduced by Levaggi and Moretto (2004);
in this paper the ￿devoted worker￿characteristics of the e⁄ort produced by
the medical sta⁄ - an aspect so far neglected in the traditional literature - is
modelled explicitly. The utility of the hospital medical sta⁄ depends both
on the salary received and on the outcome of care. In this respect, doctors
can be considered devoted workers. This assumption has important conse-
quences both on the level of investment decided by the hospital and then on
￿nal quality of in-patient care. We show that in the game developed between
the hospital and the medical sta⁄the presence of devoted doctors allows the
hospital to reduce its investment while increasing the level of quality.
We then show that, when investment in new technology is irreversible,
a purchasing rule that cancels out the option to delay (i.e. ￿ = 0; where
the purchaser reimburses the hospital only on the current level of quality) is
never optimal. From a policy perspective, this result has an important im-
plication: in the de￿nition of the long-term contract between the purchaser
and the hospital there is a trade-o⁄ between the level and the veri￿ability
of quality. The purchaser could use the substitutability between capital and
doctors￿e⁄orts to increase quality, but this reduces its ability to verify it.
The model presented in this paper is a ￿rst step in modelling quality
in a devoted workers setting and our approach can be extended in several
directions.
First of all, we could consider, as in Levaggi and Moretto (2004), that the
technology is innovative only at the beginning (￿rst period) of its adoption
when learning costs (related to the size of the investment) are higher and
future operating costs of running the technology are not known. However,
it should be considered that in the second period (in general, in subsequent
periods) the technology is consolidated and the hospital investing in the ￿rst
period produces a positive externality to the whole system.
The assumption of the devoted worker also adds new dimensions to the
quality setting of hospital care. In this paper we have in fact assumed that
all the actors care about the same type of quality, but this assumption might
be relaxed. In particular, it could be considered that the type of hospital
care quality depends on the type of treatment. For surgical treatment, for
example, clinical quality is probably very important, but for rehabilitation
or for palliative care, perceived (relational) quality might be considered more
relevant. In the latter cases, the relatively higher importance of perceived
quality might mitigate the e⁄ect of the devoted physician on the investment
decision, hence on the optimal purchasing rule. Another important extension
21could be the explicit consideration within the model of hospital competition
on quality ruled by patients￿choices. This would add another important
actor (the patient) to the model and in this case the hospital￿ s reputation
would become an essential ingredient of perceived quality.
22A Proof of Lemma 1
At t = 2; the hospital￿ s surplus is given by (11), i.e:
R2(k1;k2;e;￿) ￿ p[x + (￿ ￿ ￿)q1(k1;e) + ￿q2(k2;e;￿)]












￿ p￿￿gk2k2(k2;e;￿) < 0; (20)
If the hospital does not invest in the second period, i.e. k2 = k1; its surplus
(11) reduces to:
R2(k1;e;￿) ￿ p[x + (￿ ￿ ￿)q1(k1;e) + ￿q2(k1;e;￿)]
￿ p[x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)h(e) + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿g(k1;e) + ￿￿g(k1;e;￿)]






￿ p￿￿gk2￿(k2;e;￿) > 0 (21)
Since the value of the hospital at t = 1 is:















25Only if ￿ = 1 we get q2 = q1 and
R
2(k1;e;￿) ￿ p[x + ￿q1(k1;e)]
23easy computation shows that (22) can be written as:







f￿[R2(k1;k2(￿);e;￿) ￿ rk2(￿)] + [R2(k1;e;￿) ￿ rk1]gd￿(￿):
where ￿ is the discount factor. Then, de￿ning:







f￿[R2(k1;k2(￿);e;￿) ￿ rk2(￿)] + [R2(k1;e;￿) ￿ rk1]gd￿(￿);
by direct substitution of (8) and (11), we obtain:
V (k1;e) = G(k1;e) ￿ ￿O(k1;e)
where:
G(k1;e) ￿ (p ￿ c)x + ￿
1 Z
0
p[x + (￿ ￿ ￿)q1(k1;e) + ￿q2(k1;e;￿)]d￿(￿)
￿ (p ￿ c)x + ￿
1 Z
0
p[x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)h(e) + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿g(k1;e) + ￿￿g(k1;e;￿)]d￿(￿)







f￿[p(x + (￿ ￿ ￿)q1(k1;e) + ￿q2(k2(￿);e;￿)) ￿ rk2(￿)]








f￿[p(￿((1 ￿ ￿)h(e) + ￿g(k2(￿);e;￿))) ￿ rk2(￿)]




f￿[p￿￿g(k2(￿);e;￿) ￿ rk2(￿)] + [p￿￿g(k1;e;￿) ￿ rk1]gd￿(￿)
This concludes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The ￿rst part of the proposition is a straightforward application of the geo-
metric solution of the Nash equilibrium. For the second part, we need to
draw the hospital￿ s iso-pro￿t curve and the doctor￿ s iso-utility curve in the
(k1;e) plane.
Let￿ s start with the doctor￿ s iso-utility curve. Totally di⁄erentiating (10)
we get:
Bk1(k1;e)dk1 + Be(k1;e)de = dB







The numerator is simply given by (15) while the denominator is:
Bk1(k1;e) ￿ v￿gk1(k1;e) > 0
Then the slope of the iso-utility curve is simply determined by (15). For
a ￿xed value of k1;(24) is decreasing up to e￿ and increasing for a higher
25value of e: The same procedure determines the hospital￿ s iso-pro￿t curve.
By totally di⁄erentiating (14) we get








The numerator of (25) is simply (17) and the denumerator is given by:
Ve(k1;e) ￿ Ge(k1;e) ￿ ￿Oe(k1;e)
















Since the above expression is always positive the slope of the iso-pro￿t curve
is, for a ￿xed value of e;decreasing up to k￿
1 and increasing for a higher value
of k1: This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Since the purchasing rule a⁄ects only the hospital￿ s objective function, to
compare the Nash solutions varying the parameters of (7) we need to com-
pare the di⁄erent hospital best reaction functions.
Firstly, if ￿ = ￿ the purchasing rule becomes x2 = x+￿q2. The necessary
condition for a maximum (17) becomes:
V
￿=￿
k1 (k1;e) ￿ G
￿=￿











[p￿￿gk1(k1;e;￿) ￿ r]d￿(￿) ￿ 0
and ~ ￿ is given by (12). Since G
￿=￿
k1 (k1;e) < Gk1(k1;e) the hospital￿ s reaction
function shifts down and to the left as depicted in Figure 2.
Secondly, if ￿ = 0 the purchasing rule becomes x2 = x + ￿(q2 ￿ q1);
which makes the surplus R2(k2;k1;e;￿) independent from q at q2 = q1: The
necessary condition for a maximum (17) becomes:
V
￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿ G
￿=0











[p￿￿gk1(k1;e;￿) ￿ r]d￿(￿) ￿ 0
and ~ ￿ is still given by (12). Since G
￿=0
k1 (k1;e) < G
￿=￿
k1 (k1;e) we have another
shift to the left of the hospital￿ s reply curve as in Figure 2.
Finally, if ￿ = 0 the purchasing rule reduces to x2 = x + ￿q1: For any
given stock of q1 inherited from period 1, the surplus at t = 2 is always
constant, which makes q2(￿) = q1 for all ￿: Then, condition (17) reduces to:
V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿ G￿=0
k1 (k1;e) = r (28)
where:
G￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿ ￿p￿￿gk1(k1;e)
O￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿ 0
To compare (28) with (17), we can ￿rst rewrite Gk1(k1;e) in the following
form:













Vk1(k1;e) ￿ V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) + G
￿=0









k1 (k1;e) > 0 , k￿=0
1 cannot be greater than k1:Furthermore,
if we specify (29) for the case in which ￿ = ￿ it is easy to show that:
V
￿=￿
k1 (k1;e) ￿ V ￿=0





k1 (k1;e) > 0 we get V
￿=￿
k1 (k1;e)￿V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) > 0 and the ￿rst
part of the proposition follows.
Let￿ s now consider the second part of the proposition. By (29) (and (30)),




k1 (k1;e) ￿ G
￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿
￿Ok1(k1;e) < 0; which in turn implies k
￿=0
1 = 0: After some simple alge-
28braical manipulations we obtain:
G
￿=0

































p￿￿[gk1(k1;e;￿) ￿ gk1(k1;e)]d￿(￿) + p￿￿[gk1(k1;e; ~ ￿) ￿ gk1(k1;e)](1 ￿ ￿(~ ￿)]
If ~ ￿ < 1, the ￿rst and second terms of (31) are both negative which yields
G
￿=0
k1 (k1;e) ￿ ￿Ok1(k1;e) < 0: On the contrary if ~ ￿ > 1 the second term is
positive while the sign of the ￿rst term is ambiguous, and becomes positive







a trigger value ~ ￿ may exist such that:
Vk1(k1;e) < V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) for ￿ > ~ ￿
Vk1(k1;e) ￿ V ￿=0
k1 (k1;e) for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
This concludes the proof.
29D Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the proposition it is su¢ cient to show that the isoquals that pass
through the Nash equilibrium can be ranked.
Lemma 2 The isoqual that passes through a Nash equilibrium, say N; lies
above the hospital￿ s reply function HH and below DD to the left of N and
below HH and above DD to the right.
Proof. To do this we compare the slope of the isoqual with the slope of
the hospital￿ s reply function and the slope of the doctor￿ s reply function
respectively. Let￿ s ￿rst recall the MRT between k and e and the slope of the















By (32) and (33), the slope of the isoqual is greater than the slope of the
hospital￿ s reaction function if:










[(1 ￿ ￿)h00(e) + ￿gee]￿gk ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)h0(e) + ￿ge]￿gke
(￿gk)2 > 0
or:
(1 ￿ ￿)h00(e) + ￿gee
￿gke
>
(1 ￿ ￿)h0(e) + ￿ge
￿gk
(35)
Putting together (34) and (35), with an MRT decreasing in e; the condition
(34) becomes:






Thirdly, the condition that guarantees the stability of the Nash equilibrium












which is equivalent to (36) if m00 = 0: Therefore, if (37) holds for m00 < 0








v[(1 ￿ ￿)h00(e) + ￿gee] ￿ m00(e)
is also the inverse of the doctor￿ s best reply function.
Let￿ s consider the isoqual that passes through N. As HH shifts down
(i.e. k1 decreases) the doctor increases e along the curve DD and a new
equilibrium N0 is reached. By Lemma 2, however, N0 lies on an isoqual
lower than the one through N; with a reduction in the total quality. On the
contrary if HH shifts up (i.e. k1 increases) the doctor decreases e along the
curve DD and by Lemma 2, the new Nash solution N00 lies on an isoqual
higher than the one through N; with an increase in the total quality. This
concludes the proof.
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